

## Message Text

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ACTION SS-30

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FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

TO SECDEF PRIORITY

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S E C R E T JAKARTA 11690

E X D I S

CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD

PERSONAL FOR DEPSECDEF CLEMENTS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP (DEPSECDEF CLEMENTS)NB

SUBJ: GOI VIEW ON DISCUSSIONS WITH

DEPSECDEF CLEMENTS

REF: A) SECDEF 161937Z SEPT B) JAKARTA 11480

C) JAKARTA 11649 D) JAKARTA 10514

1. I WARMLY WELCOME YOUR FORTHCOMING VISIT TO INDONESIA  
AND APPRECIATE YOUR WILLINGNESS ALTER SCHEDULE SO MONDAY  
MEETINGS WITH SENIOR INDONESIANS BECAME POSSIBLE.

2. WHILE RECOGNIZING THAT VISIT FROM STANDPOINT OF YOU  
AND YOUR STAFF IS PRIMARILY TO GET ACQUAINTED WITH  
PERSONALITIES, PROGRAMS, AND PROBLEMS IN INDONESIA, I  
FEEL I SHOULD WARN YOU THAT INDONESIANS APPEAR TO BE  
ATTACHING SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE AS FIRST VISIT BY SENIOR  
U.S. OFFICIAL SINCE PRESIDENT FORD ASSUMED OFFICE.

AS OUR QUARTERLY ASSESSMENT SOUGHT TO POINT OUT (REF D),  
PRESIDENT SUHARTO ATTACHES MAJOR IMPORTANCE TO MILITARY  
RELATIONSHIP WITH UNITED STATES AND SAW THIS FOR MANY  
YEARS IN TERMS OF PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP HE ESTABLISHED  
WITH PRESIDENT NIXON DURING HIS 1970 VISIT TO U.S. WE

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HAVE NUMEROUS INDICATIONS THAT HE AND HIS SENIOR ADVISORS

ARE CONCERNED THAT WITH TERMINATION OF THIS SPECIAL LINK, U.S. INTEREST IN INDONESIA AND ITS MILITARY DEVELOPMENT MAY DIMINISH. REGRETTABLY, THEY DO NOT READILY ACKNOWLEDGE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THEIR OWN GROWING REVENUES AND OUR REQUIREMENTS IN CAMBODIA AND VIET NAM AND THE DECLINING CONGRESSIONAL ENTHUSIASM FOR GRANT ASSISTANCE TO INDONESIA. THEY ARE ALSO WILLINGLY INVOLVED, LARGEY FOR REASONS OF THEIR OWN, IN ICCS, BUT MANY, PARTICULARLY IN THE MILITARY, ARE CONCERNED THAT THE UNITED STATES IS TAKING A LESS ACTIVE ROLE IN SEEKING A POLITICAL SOLUTION, IS PERMITTING A DECLINE IN THE FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR BOTH THE ICCS AND SOUTH VIET NAM, AND IS PULLING IN ITS HORNS GENERALLY IN SOUTH EAST ASIA. INDONESIAN PLANNING FOR YOUR VISIT APPEARS TO BE MOVING IN DIRECTION OF FULL PLENARY DISCUSSION INVOLVING THEIR SENIOR MILITRAY OFFICIALS OF WHAT THEY CAN EXPECT FROM U.S. IN BILATERAL MILITARY AID AND IN POLITICAL, MILITARY, AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT IN INDOCHINA AND WIDER SOUTH EAST ASIAN THEATRE.

3. WE RECOGNIZE THIS IS LARGE ORDER, BUT WE BELIEVE IT CAN BE MANAGED. WHAT WE BELIEVE YOU CAN USEFULLY SAY IS THAT PRESIDENT FORD CONTINUES STRONG INTEREST IN INDONESIA AS DEMONSTRATED BY HIS RECEIVING INDONESIAN VICE PRESIDENT BEFORE HE ASSUMED OFFICE, BY HIS SPECIAL ATTENTION TO FOREIGN MINISTER MALIK AT LUNCH IN NEW YORK LAST WEEK, AND BY HIS DETERMINATION THAT U.S. WILL REMAIN STRONG AND FULFILL ITS OBLIGATIONS IN EAST ASIA. INDONESIANS WILL WELCOME WHAT YOU CAN TELL THEM OF DETAILED PLANS FOR CONTINUING U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN ASIA. AT LEAST A FEW OF THOSE PRESENT WILL HAVE SOPHISTICATED UNDERSTANDING OF OUR CONGRESSIONAL PROBLEMS AND YOU CAN SPEAK FRANKLY OF WHAT WE HOPE TO GET FROM CONGRESS, BUT OF DIFFICULTIES FACED. IMPORTANT THING WILL BE TO EMPHASIZE OUR POSITIVE EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF INDONESIA WITHOUT MAKING COMMITMENTS.

4. WE WILL HAVE OPPORTUNITY TO EXPAND THESE PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS AND DISCUSS STRATEGY IN BRIEFING SESSION PLANNED FOR SUNDAY AFTERNOON (SEPTEMBER 29) FOLLOWING LUCH AT WHICH EMBASSY OFFICERS WILL BE PREPARED DISCUSS INDONESIAN GOVERN-  
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MENTAL STRUCTURE, INTERNAL SECURITY, REGIONAL AMBITIONS, OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT, AND MILITARY POSTURE AND PROBLEMS.

5. AS TENTATIVE MONDAY (SEPTEMBER 30) SCHEDULE NOW STANDS, I WILL INTRODUCE YOU TO DEFMIN GENERAL PANGGABEAN AT 9:00 A.M. AFTER WHICH WE WILL BE JOINED AT HIS CONFERENCE TABLE BY YOUR PARTY AND PANGGABEAN'S ASSOCIATES, WHERE WIDER DISCUSSION CAN TAKE PLACE UNTIL JUST BEFORE 11 A.M.

(TIME INDONESIANS CURRENTLY EXPECT CALL ON PRESIDENT SUHARTO.)

6. PANGGABEAN AND SUHARTO WILL PROBABLY BOTH LEAD OFF WITH EXPLANATION OF INDOENSIA'S DEFENSE DEFICIENCIES, PARTICULARLY IN SEA DEFENSE AND AIR COMMUNICATIONS, EXPLAINING THAT IN FIRST FIVE YEAR PLAN MILITARY WAS CONSCIOUSLY DE-EMPHASIZED AND, AS A RESULT, IS IN VERY MINIMAL STATE OF READINESS. (WHICH, BY ALL OUR OBSERVATIONS IS TRUE.) THEY WILL PROBABLY ALSO EMPHASIZE THEIR DESIRE TO CONFINE PROCUREMENT TO TWO OR THREE COUNTRIES (U.S., U.K., AND AUSTRALIA) IN ORDER STANDARDIZE EQUIPMENT AND EASE MAINTENANCE PROBLEMS. IF THEY REFER TO INDOCHINA, THEY MAY WELL REFER TO MOUNTING COST OF KEEPING THEIR CONTINGENT IN ICCS. THEY WILL THEN PASS BALL TO YOU.

7. FOLLOWING ARE DETAILED TOPICS WHICH WE ANTICIPATED INDONESIANS WILL RAISE:

A. MILITARY ASSISTANCE: WHAT LEVEL OF GRANT MILITARY ASSISTANCE DO WE FORESEE PROVIDING INDONESIA IN FY 75 AND BEYOND? HOW MUCH FMS CREDIT WILL BE AVAILABLE? WILL WE BE ABLE TO PROVIDE THE TWO ADDITIONAL C-130 AT THE SAME PRICE (\$2.5 MILLION) AS THE FIRST, AND USING FMS CREDIT? (FYI - THESE TWO C-130S ARE MOST CRITICAL ITEMS OF ALL.) WHAT ARE THEPOSSIBILITIES FOR ADDITIONAL SALES OF MILITARY ITEMS AT CONCESSIONAL PRICES OR FROM EXCESS DEFENSE STOCKS ABROAD WHERE COST IS LOW? IN DISCUSSING ENTIRETY OF US-INDONESIAN MILITARY RELATIONSHIP YOU WILL WANT TO NOTE WE SOLD GOI TWO DES AT HIGHLY CONCESSIONAL PRICES (ABOUT \$150,000 EACH) WITH SALE OF TWO MORE SCHEDULED FOR DECEMBER 1974.

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B. US POLICY UNDER PRESIDENT FORD: WILL THERE BE ANY CHANGE IN SECURITY POLICY UNDER PRESIDENT FORD?

C. US PRESENCE IN SEA: INDONESIA IS CONCERNED THAT OWING TO CONGRESSIONAL SENTIMENT, EXECUTIVE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO IMPLEMENT ITS STATED POLICY OF MAINTAINING US PRESENCE IN SEA.

D. INDOCHINA: INDONESIA BELIEVES THAT ONLY USG CAN BRING ABOUT STABILITY IN INDOCHINA WHICH WILL PRECLUDE A COMMUNIST TAKE OVER. IN VIEW OF DECLINING US ASSISTANCE TO GVN AND GKR, GOI LOOKS TO SOME ADDITIONAL US DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES TO ACHIEVE THIS END.

(1) ICCS: DESPITE FRUSTRATIONS INVOLVED, GOI

INTENDS TO REMAIN IN ICCS AS LONG AS THERE IS SUFFICIENT ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT. HOWEVER, GOI OFFICIALS STATE THAT, SHOULD FINANCIAL CRISIS CAUSE COLLAPSE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT, INDONESIA WILL HAVE TO WITHDRAW MEN FROM TEAM SITES, AND ULTIMATELY FROM VIET NAM ALTOGETHER. GOI IS WATCHING TO SEE WHAT MEASURES US WILL TAKE TO SOLVE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND YOU ARE LIKELY TO BE QUESTIONED ON THIS.

(2) VIET NAM: ESTIMATE OF MILITARY AND POLITICAL SITUATION.

(3) CAMBODIA: ESTIMATE OF MILITARY SITUATION.  
(NOTE: INDONESIANS RECENTLY ASKED IF US MILITARY ASSISTANCE FUNDING WAS SUFFICIENT TO PERMIT THE FORMATION OF A MILITARY COMBAT UNIT INTO WHICH THE 60 KHMER PARA-COMMANDO PERSONNEL PREVIOUSLY TRAINED IN INDONESIA COULD BE INTEGRATED.)

E. LOS: WHILE US AND INDONESIAN SIDES HAVE COME CLOSE TO AGREEMENT ON ARCHIPELAGO CONCEPT, PASSAGE (INCLUDING STRAITS) AND OVERFLIGHT, AND US LOS TEAM PLANNING ANOTHER VISIT TO JAKARTA IN NOVEMBER, INDONESIANS MIGHT RAISE LOS, ASKING US SUPPORT FOR ARCHIPELAGO CONCEPT.

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